Institutions and the Search for Social and Economic Order - PPE00002H
Module summary
All human groups larger than a few people require governance institutions to manage social and economic relationships and prevent disorder. We will study these institutions using tools from game theory and case studies from a variety of times and places.
Module will run
| Occurrence | Teaching period |
|---|---|
| A | Semester 1 2023-24 |
Module aims
Institutions set the rules that govern social and economic relationships. Different human groups have designed a wide variety of different kinds of governance institutions. We will study these institutions using the tools of game theory as well as case studies from disciplines including economics, politics, anthropology, sociology, history, and law. The groups we study will range from small-scale societies in the Amazon, to pirates on the high seas, to diamond traders in New York City, to the top levels of the Russian and Ukrainian states. We will see that these seemingly very different groups face similar problems, and we will discuss the ways in which institutions designed by these different groups succeed (or sometimes fail) in promoting orderly social interactions. We will apply the lessons we learn from these case studies to analyse governance in contemporary voluntary associations, firms, and states.
Module learning outcomes
By the end of the module, students will be able to:
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Understand the language of game theory as used to study institutions and governance
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Use this understanding to recognize common problems and solutions across institutional case studies from a wide variety of times and places
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Independently apply this understanding to analyse novel cases
Indicative assessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 90 |
| Essay/coursework | 10 |
Special assessment rules
None
Indicative reassessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 90 |
| Essay/coursework | 10 |
Module feedback
Students will receive written timely feedback on their assessment in no later than 25 working days. They will have the opportunity to discuss their feedback during the module tutor’s regular feedback and guidance hours.
Indicative reading
Napoleon A. Chagnon (2012), Yanomamo: The Fierce People, Legacy Edition, Wadsworth Publishing
Peter T. Leeson (2007), “An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization,” Journal of Political Economy 115:6
Lisa Bernstein (1992), “Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry,” Journal of Legal Studies 21:1
Keith Darden (2001), “Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine Under Kuchma,” East European Constitutional Review, 10:2/3