Studying at York
Freedom and Metaphysics - PHI00107M
- Department: Philosophy
- Credit value: 20 credits
- Credit level: M
- Academic year of delivery: 2024-25
Module summary
This module will explore some of the key issues in the free will debate, including issues around the metaphysics of agency, and around moral responsibility.
Professional requirements
N/A
Related modules
None
Module will run
| Occurrence | Teaching period |
|---|---|
| A | Semester 1 2024-25 |
Module aims
- To learn about freedom, moral responsibility and metaphysics
- To engage constructively with the work of other students in seminar discussion
- To improve the skills of philosophical argument, writing and presenting
- To gain an interdisciplinary perspective on an issue, in particular to see the overlap between philosophy, law, and science.
Module learning outcomes
Subject Content
By the end of this module, students should be able to display an in depth and systematic understanding of several classic contributions to the debate about free will and the metaphysics of moral responsibility, as well as a grasp of the forefront of current research in the area.
Academic and Graduate Skills
By the end of this module, students will have developed better skills of close reading and should be able to analyse complex texts in detail and depth. And, students will show the ability to work independently and self-critically on an extended essay that goes beyond the core framework that is provided in seminars.
Module content
Indicative topics include:
-
arguments for the impossibility of freedom and moral responsibility
-
‘deep self’ theories of moral responsibility
-
moral luck
-
moral responsibility and mental illness
-
nature of excuses
Indicative assessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 100 |
Special assessment rules
None
Additional assessment information
N/A
Indicative reassessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 100 |
Module feedback
On formative within a week.
On summative work within 25 working days.
Indicative reading
Derek Pereboom (2022): Free Will. Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Mind (overview).
Harry Frankfurt (1971) Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20.
Jonathan Gingerich (2022). ‘Spontaneous Freedom’. Ethics 133 (1):38-71.
Paulina Sliwa (2019). The Power of Excuses. Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (1):37-71.
Helen Steward (2011): A Metaphysics for freedom, OUP
Susan Wolf (1987). ‘Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility’. In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 46-62.