Studying at York
Experimental Philosophy: The Psychology of Philosophy - PHI00100M
- Department: Philosophy
- Credit value: 20 credits
- Credit level: M
- Academic year of delivery: 2023-24
Module summary
Should we pull the lever to divert the train, and kill one person to save five? Are we responsible for the unintended consequences of our actions? Are free will and determinism compatible? Are zombies conceivable? Do men and women, or members of different cultures, differ in their responses to philosophical thought experiments?
Experimental philosophy (x-phi) is a recent interdisciplinary research programme that uses methods from psychology and the social sciences to address core philosophical problems. Co-taught by Keith Allen (Philosophy) and Philip Quinlan (Psychology), this module will introduce you to a range of philosophical questions that x-phi has addressed, consider the reaction of ‘mainstream’ philosophers, and teach you practical skills in survey design and analysis.
Module will run
| Occurrence | Teaching period |
|---|---|
| A | Semester 1 2023-24 |
Module aims
The module aims to
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Introduce students to experimental philosophy (x-phi)
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Consider responses to x-phi from traditional ‘mainstream’ philosophy
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Teach students basic skills in experimental design and analysis
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Help students to develop the ability to write clearly and effectively for an interdisciplinary audience
Module learning outcomes
By the end of this module, students should be able to:
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Explain what is distinctive of the x-phi approach to philosophy.
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Evaluate the degree of success that the x-phi approach has had in addressing a range of traditional philosophical problems.
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Write in a way that is accessible to an interdisciplinary audience.
Module content
Lectures will be 2 hours long, with the the 1st hour used to introduce the week’s topic and the 2nd hour used to give students hands-on experience designing and analysing simple experiments. A separate 1 hour seminar will give students opportunity to discuss the broader philosophical issues.
Assessment for the module will be a review essay, providing a review and evaluation of work in a particular area of x-phi, modelled on the style of review essay published in Trends in Cognitive Science. This essay should be written for an interdisciplinary audience, providing a ‘concise and curated’ update on the latest research in a particular area, indentifying future directions for research and current and future limitations (see Instructions for Authors, on which the essay guidelines will be modelled)
Indicative assessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 100 |
Special assessment rules
None
Indicative reassessment
| Task | % of module mark |
|---|---|
| Essay/coursework | 100 |
Module feedback
Formative feedback will be returned within two weeks.
Summative feedback will be returned in accordance with University guidance.
Indicative reading
Appiah, K. 2007. ‘Experimental Philosophy’, Presidential Address of the APA 2007: appiah.net/wp-content/.../APA-Lecture-2007-for-Web.pdf
Buckwalter, W. and Stich, S. Gender and Philosophical Intuition, in J. Knobe and S. Nichols eds. Experimental Philosophy, v2. Oxford University Press.
Cappelen, H. 2012. Philosophy Without Intuitions (Oxford University Press)
Frances et. al. 2017. Simulating Moral Actions: An Investigation of Personal Force in Virtual Moral Dilemmas, Nature: Scientific Reports: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-13909-9
Knobe, J. 2006. ‘The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Use of Folk Psychology’, Philosophical Studies 130: 203-231.
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. 2008a. ‘An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto’, in Knobe and Nichols eds. Experimental Philosophy (Oxford University Press).
Nagel, J. 2012. ‘Intuitions and Experiments: A Defence of the Case Method in Epistemology, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85.
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., and Turner, J. 2006. ‘Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28-53.
Systsma, J. and Machery, E. 2010. Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience, Philosophical Studies 151: 299-327.
Weatherson, B. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counter-Examples?’ Philosophical Studies 115: 1-31.
Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2001. ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’, Philosophical Topics 29: 429-460. Reprinted in Knobe and Nichols eds., Experimental Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2008).