Discussion of advanced topics in meta-ethics/normative ethics. Topics covered: the possibility of altruism, internal reasons, moral realism, error theory, expressivism, consequentialism, deontology, consequentialism, hybrid ethical theory, particularism, demandingness of morality, saving the one or the many.
Occurrence | Teaching period |
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A | Semester 2 2023-24 |
The aim of the module is to explore key themes about our ordinary notion of a reason for action, how that relates to the idea of right action, and how rightness is related to the idea of the value of an outcome. Specifically, on this module we will be reading, discussing and writing about:
Key themes in meta-ethics about reasons and the objectivity of morality;
Theories of the nature of moral language;
The main positions in normative ethics and how they are shaped by prior meta-ethical commitments.
By the end of this module students should be able to:
By the end of this module, students will be able to:
This module builds on previous ethics modules to develop an advanced understanding of key themes in meta-ethics and normative ethics and their systematic interconnection. Themes such as the nature of reasons, agent-relativity and agent-neutrality about reasons in meta-ethics will be used to structure the different positions assessed in normative ethics – consequentialism, virtue ethics and hybrid ethical theory. An underlying theme is the connection between our ordinary notion of a reason and theoretical accounts of rightness, and the connection between whatever makes an action right and the idea of the intrinsic value of an outcome.
Task | % of module mark |
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Essay/coursework | 100 |
None
Task | % of module mark |
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Essay/coursework | 100 |
All feedback will be returned in line with current University and Departmental policy.
Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford University Press, 1979);
Christian Seidel (ed.) Consequentialism: New Directions New Problems (Oxford University Press, 2019);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Normativity, (Open Court, 2008);
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, (Fontana, 1985).