Occurrence | Teaching period |
---|---|
A | Spring Term 2022-23 |
The module has the following aims:
To promote knowledge and understanding of consciousness and the philosophical problems attendant upon trying to provide an explanation of it.
To promote analytical skills, and skills in written communication by offering in the lectures an analysis of the main arguments concerning the nature of consciousness, which is then subject to independent scrutiny in seminars, and forms the basis of written work upon which feedback will be given.
To promote a critical and independent approach to ideas by focussing on a substantial problem in philosophy of mind and trying to arrive at a clear view of what would be a viable means of dealing with it, rather than teaching general theories of mind.
To foster respect for reason and argument as tools for extending knowledge and settling debates by displaying how the analysis of, and debate concerning, our understanding of ourselves, has deepened our understanding.
Subject Content:
The module will focus on philosophical approaches to the understanding of consciousness. The topics to be covered will be: consciousness and the explanatory gap; eliminativism; functionalism and qualia; higher order thought and availability for higher order thought theories of consciousness, representationalism about consciousness.
Academic and graduate skills:
Task | % of module mark |
---|---|
Essay/coursework | 100 |
None
Formative work: 1-page essay plan on A4, 11 point, to be submitted at the end of Week 8.
Summative work: 4,000-word essay due on Monday, Week 2 of Summer Term.
Task | % of module mark |
---|---|
Essay/coursework | 100 |
Students will receive feedback on the formative essay plan by the end of Week 10.
Students will receive feedback on the 4000-word summative assessment and re-assessment four weeks after they submit it.
Introductory text:
Amy Kind, ‘Qualia’, Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/qualia/
David Chalmers (1995), ‘Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness’, in his (2010), The Character of Consciousness, esp. pp. 3-19.