Having too much

For many, limitarianism has an intuitive plausibility: given the world in which we live, wouldn’t it be much better if the wealth of the rich were to be spent on alleviating suffering and disadvantages, and battling the various crises that the world is facing? The question is whether limitarianism can properly be spelled out and defended. This requires a number of different things. First, since limitarianism is a riches-referring claim, we need a proper conceptualisation of ‘riches’, in order to avoid that this threshold would be set arbitrarily. Yet surprisingly enough, there is a very large literature on the conceptualisation of ‘poverty’, but almost nothing on the conceptualisation of ‘riches’.  Developing a conceptualisation of riches, as well as to respond to possible objections to that conceptualisation, will therefore be my first task. I then defend limitarianism based on two different arguments: the democratic argument, and the argument of urgent unmet needs. Finally, I discuss whether limitarianism should be defended as a moral or rather as a political doctrine. I analyse and reject two important objections to limitarianism, which entail that limitarianism is violating equality of opportunities, and that limitarianism does not take incentive considerations into account.

Find out more about Ingrid Robeyns.

This seminar is hosted jointly with the Morrell Centre for Toleration, Dept of Politics.