Professor Maria Alvarez Kings College London

Event details

Blameworthiness and Redemption

Suppose that someone is, at some point, blameworthy for a wrong. Must they remain blameworthy for it, and to the same extent, forever? Some argue that blameworthiness cannot diminish, even if the appropriateness of blaming can change over time. Their opponents advance views according to which the suffering of blame or guilt, the loss of a relevant psychological flaw, or making amends can reduce blameworthiness. In this paper I argue that, although each of those views get something right, none succeeds fully in vindicating the possibility of reduced blameworthiness. I propose instead a unified ‘quality of will’ account of both, synchronic and diachronic blameworthiness. I argue that this account makes room for the possibility of redemption which, I claim, can vindicate reduced blameworthiness for a past wrong.

This is a Philosophy Colloquium Event.