SEMINAR: Shapley value-based rules for distributing duration costs in stochastic projects Seminar

Seminar
This event has now finished.
  • Date and time: Thursday 6 June 2024, 1pm to 2pm
  • Location: In-person only
    A/D271 (above Alcuin Porters)
  • Audience: Open to staff, students
  • Admission: Free admission, booking not required

Event details

Speaker: Ignacio Miguel García Jurado (Coruña)

Abstract:  In this seminar we present two procedures, based on the Shapley value of cooperative games, for allocating project duration costs (due to delays, for example) among the various agents responsible for their realisation. To compare the two procedures we illustrate them with several examples and characterise them mathematically using parallel properties. We also study other desirable properties of the procedures and make some remarks on how to calculate them in practice.

The content of this seminar expands on the results we published in: Goncalves-Dosantos, Garcia-Jurado and Costa (2020) “Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays” 4OR 18, 457-476.

Host: Yuan Ju (York)